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Accepting Authoritative Decisions: Humans
as Wary Cooperators
John R. Hibbing University of Nebraska-Lincoln
John R. Alford Rice University
Why are people more willing to accept some governmental decisions than others? In this article, we present results from a
series of original experiments showing that people’s reactions to a given outcome are heavily influenced by the procedure
employed to produce the outcome. We find that subjects react much less favorably when a decision maker intentionally keeps
a large payoff, thereby leaving the subject with a small payoff, than when that same payoff results from a procedure based
on chance or on desert. Moreover, subjects react less favorably to outcomes rendered by decision makers who want to be
decision makers than they do to identical outcomes selected by reluctant decision makers. Our results are consistent with
increasingly prominent theories of behavior emphasizing people’s aversion to being played for a “sucker,” an attitude that
makes perfect sense if people’s main goal is not to acquire as many tangible goods as possible but to make sure they are a
valued part of a viable group composed of cooperative individuals.
Acentral requirement—perhaps the centralrequirement—of civil society is a willingnessof its members to accept binding decisions and
to view the makers of those decisions as legitimate.
When the civil society is of sufficient size to preclude
universal involvement in the making of key decisions,
it becomes necessary to ask people to accept and to
view as legitimate decisions that have been made by
individuals other than themselves. Moreover, societies of
this magnitude will inevitably have innumerable diverse
demands placed upon the scarce available resources, thus
rendering it virtually impossible for any given person or
group to receive an outcome they regard as favorable.
Securing popular acceptance of decisions that are both
unsatisfying and not directly under people’s control is a
remarkably tall order for a political system.
John R. Hibbing is the Foundation Regents University Professor of Political Science, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Lincoln, NE 68588-0328
(jhibbing@unl.edu). John R. Alford is Associate Professor of Political Science at Rice University, Houston, TX 77251 (jra@rice.edu).
An earlier version of this article was presented at the 2002 annual meeting of the Human Behavior and Evolution Society, Rutgers University.
The authors gratefully acknowledge the invaluable assistance of Kevin Arceneaux, Martin Johnson, and Stacy Ulbig, the suggestions of
Chris Larimer, Levente Littvay, Kevin Smith, Robert Stein, and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, and the financial support of the College of Social
Sciences, Rice University.
1Among political scientists, a very partial list of those believing procedural factors are relevant to the study of people’s trust in, and
acceptance of, representative government would include Bianco (1994); Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht (1997); Farnsworth (2003); Fenno
(2003); Hetherington (1998); Orren (1997); and Ulbig and Funk (1999).
2Besides, there is evidence that in some circumstances greater resources do not increase people’s happiness, satisfaction, and, presumably,
willingness to accept decisions (for a summary of this research, see Frank 1999; also see Frey and Stutzer 2002).
How might it be accomplished? Our aim in this arti-
cle is to identify the situations that facilitate people’s ac-
ceptance of unpalatable binding decisions that have been
made by others; in other words, that facilitate acceptance
of the type of decisions people commonly perceive to be
made by representative government in a complex, het-
erogeneous society such as the United States. Since it is
unrealistic to expect that legitimacy could be bought by
magically increasing the resources available to distribute
to all residents, like a growing number of social scien-
tists,1 we pay special attention to the possibility that dif-
ferent decision-making processes will have an impact. The
finding that process affects people’s decision acceptance
independent of the outcome itself is a hopeful one since
it is much more feasible to change decision-making pro-
cesses than to create additional resources.2
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The Reasons People Care About How
and Why Decisions Are Made
Why might we expect people to respond more favorably
to an outcome rendered by Process A than to that very
same outcome rendered by Process B? Indeed, many ob-
servers of politics seem to assume procedures are not really
of much relevance, that people view processes as merely
means to ends, and that all that matters to them is what
they get. Spatial theories of voting, for example, locate
people on policy space and then assume that individual
voters are motivated solely by the desire to maximize their
policy (outcome) preferences by voting for the candidate
or party they believe to be closest to those preferences. Peo-
ple’s perceptions of the process never enter the picture. As
Popkin puts it, the prevailing wisdom is that people make
judgments on the basis of “results and are generally ig-
norant of or indifferent about the methods by which the
results are achieved” (1991, 99).
Still, in several social science disciplines as well as
in the natural sciences, interest in the consequences of
“nonoutcome” characteristics of decision-making set-
tings has grown tremendously in recent years. In psychol-
ogy, Tyler has led the way in demonstrating that people do
“not react to the degree to which they received a personally
beneficial decision. Instead, they react to how fairly the
decision was made by the authority” (Tyler 2001, 234; see
also, Boehm 1999 and Tyler 1990, on why people are averse
to self-serving authority figures). Tyler’s conclusions are
often based on data from participants in the legal sys-
tem. In a study typical of his approach, Tyler targeted 652
Chicago residents who had “recent personal experiences
with the police and courts” (2001, 233). By administering
a posttest survey, he found that among those defendants
who were found guilty, satisfaction with and acceptance
of the verdict was greater when they had positive percep-
tions of the process that led to that verdict. Though this
general finding of an independent effect of process is now
widely accepted by psychologists, disagreement has long
been present over the particular features of the process
that lead to the most favorable (or unfavorable) reactions
(see Brockner and Wiesenfeld 1996; Cohen 1985; Thibaut
and Walker 1975).
In economics, a growing and influential group of
scholars has compiled impressive evidence that people
are not just interested in absolute gains.3 Some of these
3The best example of this influence is that, along with psychologist
Daniel Kahneman (who also studies “nonmaximizing” behavior),
Vernon Smith was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2002
for his work employing experiments on a variety of problems in-
cluding why people react as they do to various decision outcomes
and processes.
researchers, for example, have stressed people’s preference
for relative as opposed to absolute gains. It turns out, peo-
ple express high levels of satisfaction when they receive $3
from another player who keeps $3, but low levels of sat-
isfaction when they receive $3 from another player who
keeps $13. By holding constant the payoff offered to the
receiver and then varying the size of the pot (and there-
fore the amount the other player proposes to keep), the
crucial role of relativity becomes apparent (Frank 1999,
115–21; Kahn and Murnighan 1993). As such, these find-
ings run against the more traditional economic claim that
when making decisions people exclude from considera-
tion the interests of their “opposite number” and focus
only on maximizing their own absolute gains (Buchanan
and Tullock 1962, 18).
Scholars from a variety of fields, including political
science, have demonstrated the extent to which social
context influences people’s reactions to decisions. Peo-
ple are affected by whether they have interacted (even
briefly) with the decision maker prior to the decision, by
whether they are likely to interact with the decision maker
again, by whether they perceive the decision maker to be
a member of their “in-group,” and by whether the deci-
sion maker is perceived to be a decent human being or to
have “earned” in a fair contest the right to be the decision
maker (see Blount 1995; Dawes, van de Kragt, and Orbell
1990; Guth and Tietz 1990; Hoffman, McCabe, and Smith
1996; Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1986; Lubell and
Scholz 2001; Masters 1982; Masters and Sullivan 1989;
Morris and Sim 1998; Orbell and Dawes 1991; Ostrom
1998; Ostrom and Walker 2002; Smith 2000; Sullivan and
Masters 1988; Thompson, Kray, and Lind 1998). Typi-
cally, for example, people are more than willing to take
a loss themselves in order to punish someone who has
behaved badly or to cooperate with someone who has be-
haved nobly (see, for example, Boyd and Richerson 1992;
Henrich and Boyd 2001; Thaler 1992).
The evidence that people are concerned with factors
other than outcome is undisputed; instead, the dispute
centers on the reason people are so influenced by the
decision-making setting and by perceptions of the other
people involved in the interaction. In fact, this dispute,
involving as it does classic arguments about nature versus
nurture, is one we do not pretend to be able to resolve.
Here, we provide only a taste of the arguments and an
indication of the theoretical perspective generating our
hypotheses.
One common explanation for nonmaximizing be-
havior is that humans retain in their psyches a strong and
innate desire for fair distributions (see Kravitz and Gunto
1992; Rawls 1971). Two problems with this explanation
immediately suggest themselves: one empirical and one
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theoretical. In experiments, people do gravitate toward
fair allocations, even if doing so is costly, but their ten-
dency to be fair vanishes if steps are taken to protect their
identity from the experimenter and, especially, from af-
fected players (see Hoffman et al. 2000; see also Larimer
2002). People are less concerned with fairness than with
the appearance of fairness. But even if this desire for fair-
ness were more robust, we would still be left with the ques-
tion of why humans would carry with them such a nonra-
tional concern. A satisfactory theory for people’s behavior
must go beyond the simple assertion that “that is the way
people are.” Such a statement is not a theory but merely an
atheoretical admission that we cannot understand—and
as a result must just accept—the human condition.
Another (related) explanation is that, after beginning
life with a concern only for our own tangible outcomes,
we learn social sensitivity and even empathy as we de-
velop. As one supporter of this view puts it, our “heritage
has hardwired us to be boundedly self-seeking at the same
time that we are capable of learning heuristics and norms,
such as reciprocity” (Ostrom 1998, 2). The message is that
self-serving behavior is what we are programmed to do
but we can be trained to be nice under certain conditions.
Given this theory’s view that nonmaximizing behaviors
are tacked on, it is no wonder they are generally character-
ized as “paradoxes,” “anomalies” (Thaler 1992), “quirks,”
and “oddities” (Cosmides and Tooby 1994, 327).
This view that a concern for others and, therefore,
for the context of decisions is not natural but rather the
product of societal teaching and norms is currently the
dominant view in the social sciences.4 We cannot disprove
this theory here but we can describe and briefly defend
an alternative and, we believe, more satisfying theory. In
brief, this theory flows from Darwinian biology and holds
that, far from being an add-on, our sociality—that is, our
frequent concern for the welfare of our group and for
our own place in the group, our eagerness to conform
and to gauge our own success by that of those around us,
our desire and ability to “read” and to empathize with
other people, and our tendency to view members of out-
groups with disfavor—is deeply ingrained in the human
condition and has been for millions of years.5
4The opposite view—that humans are born noble and selfless but
are taught to be corrupt by their fellow creatures and by society
generally—is still proffered occasionally but seems to be less popu-
lar today than it was in the time of anthropologists like Boas (1911)
and Mead (1928), political theorists like Rousseau (1947 [1762]),
and artists like Gauguin.
5A small sampling of the research utilizing this approach in-
cludes Axelrod (1984); Bowles and Gintis (2002); Cosmides and
Tooby (1992); Dawkins (1976, 1982); Frank (1988); Massey (2002);
Masters (1993); Nowak, Page, and Sigmund (2000); Ridley (1996);
Somit and Peterson (1997, 1999); and Wiegele (1979); and Wright
(1994).
Humans’ sensitivity to social arrangements may very
well be “hardwired” into our nature. Depending on the
specific environmental conditions, this sensitivity will re-
sult in great variation in the extent to which human
behavior maximizes absolute short-term interests or is
other-regarding. In this sense, the answer to the nature
or nurture question is “yes.” But the notion that humans
must be taught to be social is almost certainly inaccurate.
At a remarkably early age, babies display empathy (Pinker
2002). We can learn maximizing behavior from environ-
mental stimuli just as much as we can learn social behav-
ior, as is evident in the research showing that students
taking economics courses are more likely to increase their
level of maximizing behavior than students taking other
courses (see Frank, Gilovich, and Regan 1993; Marwell
and Ames 1981).
The idea that behavior has even a modest biological
basis is still upsetting to many people, including schol-
ars. But upsetting or not, the evidence seems firm and is
growing. Beavers know how to build a dam even when
they have not seen other beavers do so; monkeys raised
isolated in a lab fear a snake after viewing a videotape of
another monkey’s fear of a snake but can never be taught
to be scared of other creatures and objects no matter how
many videos they see of monkeys being scared of those
things (Dawkins 1982; Mineka and Cook 1993).6
In humans, people suffering from autism (a condi-
tion known to be at least partially genetic) help us to see
the kinds of social skills that the vast majority of the popu-
lation takes for granted. Most autistic individuals are said
to lack a “theory of mind,” meaning they are unable to
view social situations from the perspective of another per-
son (see Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg, and Cohen 2000);
thus, they are often unable to form normal social relation-
ships. Autistic individuals have difficulty understanding
how to make other people happy since this requires em-
pathic abilities they lack. The point is that the “sociality
as a learned behavior” theory seems to suggest that all
humans are first autistic but then most learn to be other-
wise, a vision of human development that is not accepted
by experts in the area. Along with evolutionary psychol-
ogists, we find more attractive and accurate the notion
that, with a few unfortunate exceptions, people are born
social. Clearly, some of these social abilities cannot man-
ifest themselves until brain development has reached a
certain stage, but children who have been raised with in-
sufficient human contact do not turn out to be maxi-
mizing but otherwise regular people; they turn out to be
behaviorally dysfunctional. We are programmed for social
contact. When this contact fails to materialize we are not
6In fact, phobias generally are almost certainly innate (see Marks
and Nesse 1994).
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left in a “natural” state but rather in a lamentably unnat-
ural state. In this sense, ascribing second-class citizenship
to social as opposed to maximizing behavior is mistaken.
Not surprisingly, computer simulations have revealed
that socially sensitive individuals have a clear evolution-
ary advantage over those with fixed decision rules such as
“always maximize personal short-term gains” or “always
sacrifice for other people” (see Fehr and Gachter 2002;
Rauch 2002). In these simulations, groups composed of
egoists do not trust each other and are unable to take ad-
vantage of any of the benefits that group life was designed
to produce in the first place, such as repelling predators
and securing prey (just as Fukuyama 1995, and Putnam
2000, point out also happens in the modern world).
Groups composed of altruists also lose out in these simu-
lations since they are vulnerable to the presence of even a
single mutant egoist and their defenses against out-groups
are wanting. Instead, the groups that survive in simula-
tions are those whose members follow a more compli-
cated set of rules: (1) cooperate with others in the group
as long as others are cooperating; but (2) when others are
behaving in a self-serving fashion, cease cooperating and
look for avenues to punish noncooperators even if punish-
ment is personally costly. Not coincidentally, this behav-
ior is similar to the tit-for-tat behavior that Trivers (1971)
found so successful in nature and that Axelrod (1984)
found so successful in his computer simulations.7 We call
individuals who follow these rules wary cooperators since
their first impulse is to cooperate8 but they are ever wary
of the behavior of others. And the evidence is strong that
social behavior of this sort is advantageous in the long
run.
Wary cooperators display two, often competing, de-
sires. They want a reputation as a fair, desirable, possibly
generous, but certainly not selfish, person. But they know
this is not enough. No matter how solid their personal
reputation for contributing to the group, a danger still ex-
ists that some miscreant within the group will treat them
with less respect and thoughtfulness than they deserve.
In other words, in addition to nurturing their reputation,
people must also worry about members of the group who
would take advantage of others if given the chance. Those
7The main difference has to do with punishment. The prisoners
dilemma game employed by Axelrod does not really permit pun-
ishment; only a decision against cooperating in the next round.
Recent work has placed ever greater emphasis on the role of pun-
ishment in producing cooperative group behavior (see Bowles and
Gintis 2002; Henrich and Boyd 2001; Price, Cosmides, and Tooby
2002).
8In contrast to the expectations of theorists such as Olson (1965)
who anticipate that people will free-ride whenever they have the
opportunity.
who have been accorded a special, powerful place in the
group (decision makers in modern governments, for ex-
ample) are especially dangerous to the rank and file and
are likely to come in for special scrutiny (more on this
shortly). People thus spend much of their existence try-
ing to avoid being perceived as a leech by those who are
other-regarding and being played for a sucker by those
who are self-serving.9 Either eventuality could result in
losing a valued, perhaps essential, place in the group.
With regard to life in populous representative democ-
racies, interactions with government are more likely to be
about sucker aversion than about leech aversion. Not be-
ing perceived as a leech is generally accomplished through
the decisions we make, while not being played for a sucker
is more likely to entail deciding whether or not to accept
the decisions of others. Most people residing in large rep-
resentative democracies such as the United States rarely
make binding collective allocation decisions themselves.
By definition, this task is typically left up to representa-
tives. But most people in representative democracies do
react to the allocation decisions of others, and this is pre-
cisely the topic of the research reported in this article: the
conditions under which people are more or less likely to
accept an authoritative decision made by others.
In sum, the theory that successful group life requires
humans to be particularly sensitive to self-serving behav-
ior by others, particularly by the powerful, provides an
explanation for previous findings indicating the impor-
tance of nonmaximizing goals, and it also offers guidance
into the particular types of goals that people are likely to
have regarding the decision-making process. Specifically,
the theory suggests that people are using decisions and de-
cision processes to draw inferences about decision makers.
Are decision makers concerned for others? Are they try-
ing to feather their own nests? Are they driven by personal
ambition? Recent public opinion research indicates that
the substance of most individual political decisions is of
only passing concern to most people but the traits of other
people, and especially the traits of powerful other people,
is of great concern (see Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002).
As a result, other things being equal, people should be
more accepting of authoritative decisions when they are
made by decision makers believed to be unconcerned with
either acquiring power or with benefiting themselves at
9The tension arises because taking steps to avoid being perceived
as a leech (such as cooperating when the actions of others in the
group are not known) usually makes us more vulnerable to being
played for a sucker just as taking steps to avoid being played for a
sucker (such as not cooperating when the actions of others are not
known) usually makes us more vulnerable to being perceived as a
leech.
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the expense of others.10 In other words, we predict that
decisions will be more acceptable if they indicate that the
decision maker is the kind of person who would help to
make a viable social group.11
The Ultimatum Game
In order to test this theory, we need a setting in which peo-
ple can be observed reacting to an authoritative decision
made by someone else, and we need to be able to hold the
outcome itself constant while altering the procedure used
to arrive at that outcome. Clearly, an experimental setting
is necessary to meet these requirements. The framework
we employ for testing the theory utilizes the so-called ul-
timatum game. This game was first introduced by Guth,
Schmittberge, and Schwarze over 20 years ago (1982), and
since then has been replicated and extended in hundreds
of scholarly publications to the point that it will soon sur-
pass the prisoners dilemma as the single most employed
experimental scenario (see Nowak, Page, and Sigmund
2000, 1773; for a good review, see Guth and Tietz 1990).
In this single-shot, two-player game, Player 1 (the alloca-
tor) is asked to divide a sum of money with Player 2 (the
receiver). The receiver is then presented with the alloca-
tor’s proposal and has the choice of either accepting or
rejecting that proposal; however, if the receiver’s decision
is to reject the allocator’s proposal, neither player receives
any of the money.
The way to maximize short-term tangible benefits is
for the allocator to give the receiver the smallest amount
of money greater than zero (epsilon) since this places the
receiver in the position of either taking that small amount
or being left with nothing—and short-term maximizers
faced with this choice will take the small amount. But
without exception the actual results of ultimatum exper-
iments depart dramatically from this standard expecta-
tion.12 With regard to the allocator, rather than keeping
all but a modest portion of the money, the modal decision
is to split the pot equally between the allocator and the
10Note that preventing decision makers from benefiting themselves
can be accomplished either by finding/training nonself-interested
philosopher-kings (Plato’s solution) or by structuring institutional
arrangements in such a way that decision makers are incapable of
enriching themselves (Madison’s solution).
11We believe strongly that the behavior we call wary cooperation
is the product of biological evolution but we recognize that the
empirical results we are about to report do not constitute a test of
whether the origin of this behavior is biological rather than social.
12This statement is true of every industrialized social setting and
even of the numerous hunter-gatherer societies tested (see Henrich
et al. 2002).
receiver, and the median proposal is for the allocator to
give up about 40% to the receiver. Not to be outdone, re-
ceivers also typically fail to maximize short-term tangible
benefits. On those rare occasions when the allocator does
decide to keep most of the pot, thereby offering only a
small allocation to the receiver, a large percentage of re-
ceivers reject the proposal. To be specific, offers of 30%
or less are rejected better than 50% of the time (Nowak,
Page, and Sigmund 2000, 1773). As one scholar colorfully
described it, the attitude of receivers toward allocators is
often “take your offer of epsilon and shove it” (Thaler
1992, 35).
Economists have been far and away the main utiliz-
ers of the ultimatum game, and their primary emphasis,
not surprisingly, has been on the allocator’s initial deci-
sion. Experimental designs have rarely included a survey
of the receiver measuring the extent to which the decision
is accepted as legitimate, fair, or satisfying.13 This is un-
fortunate since, as political scientists, our interest in the
ultimatum game centers around what it can tell us about
the reactions of those affected by decisions (the receivers
not the allocators), and it is these reactions that we must
understand if we hope to make sense of people’s relation-
ship with their government and if we are to gain some
insight into how that relationship might be improved. In
short, while psychological and economic experimental re-
search has pointed us in a useful new direction, designs
such as the ultimatum game need to be modified if they
are to help us understand the political arena generally
and people’s acceptance of authoritative and unfavorable
decisions specifically.
Like all experiments, ours will simplify reality but it
does capture many of the essential features of the mod-
ern governing process (power given to a decision maker
who makes an allocation decision that is less generous
than the recipient would like). If, within the confines of
this experimental setting, we can identify the conditions
that increase and decrease the likelihood that subjects will
accept an unfavorable, binding decision made by an in-
dividual who has been granted authority, we will have
gained insight into the situations in which people will
accept decisions made by real-life governments.
13The experiments coming out of psychology may be closer to the
mark in this sense; however, confining analysis to a judicial setting
does not allow manipulation of the actual decision-making process,
so these studies cannot help us determine the effects on acceptance
produced by a decision maker who stands to benefit from the de-
cision. Further, by merely asking people their perception of the
process, the design is unable to eliminate projection. For example,
participants in the legal process who know they were guilty may be
more likely to express a belief that the process was fair and a belief
that the decision itself (guilty) was acceptable and legitimate, even
though there is no causal relationship operating.
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Process, Not Only Outcome
To test the hypothesis that procedure affects acceptance,
we modified the ultimatum game in the following fash-
ion. The experiment was set up so that, while receivers
thought they were playing against another real person, in
actuality allocation decisions were dictated by us ahead
of time and only seemed to be influenced by a player at
one of the other computer terminals. We presented each
experimental subject (all playing the role of receiver) with
identical allocation offers, thereby enabling us to observe
variations in acceptance attributable solely to the manner
in which that allocation proposal was determined.
Here is how the experiment was conducted. In late
2001, subjects were recruited from the greater Rice Univer-
sity community (some students, some staff). They were
promised $10 for their participation and told that there
was a chance they could receive up to $20 more depend-
ing upon decisions made during the experiment. Subjects
were ushered into a room with 29 computer terminals in
individual cubicles. A pretest survey came on their screens,
and subjects were told that they would receive $10 for
completing the items. In this fashion, we compiled infor-
mation on subjects’ political involvement and views, on
their demographic background, as well as on their trust in
others and in the government. Once the instrument was
completed, for purposes of realism, subjects were asked to
wait a moment for their “partner” to complete the survey;
then the ultimatum game began.14
The first screen described the game to subjects and
asked them to wait a moment while the computer, via ran-
dom selection, identified either the subject or the matched
player as the allocator (as opposed to the receiver). After
this delay, a screen popped up telling the subject that he
was the receiver. At this point the process intervention was
introduced. All subjects were told that there was $20 to be
allocated (with whole dollars being indivisible) and that
the allocator (the fictitious Player 1 in the dyad) could
choose one of three methods to allocate the money. First,
the allocator could opt for personal discretion and simply
14Of course, a truly representative sample is not required since the
experiment randomized cell assignment internally. Nonetheless, it
is important to demonstrate that our subjects are not grossly atypi-
cal. On the basis of the limited demographic information available
to us, this would certainly appear to be the case. Forty seven% of
our subjects were female; 60% were white; 13% were Hispanic; 11%
were African American; 11% were Asian-American; 33% claimed
to be liberal; 48% moderate; 17% conservative; and ages ranged
from 35 to 19. So our subjects may be a little younger and a little
more liberal than national figures but on the whole they constitute
a reasonable mix, particularly in terms of race and gender. Unlike
many experiments, a sizable proportion of our subjects were not
students.
decide how much to keep and how much to offer to the
receiver (obviously, the total of these two figures had to
equal $20). Second, the allocator could leave the alloca-
tion to chance. If this option were selected, subjects were
told that the computer, using a random number gener-
ator, would identify the specific allocation to be offered,
with each of the 21 possible allocations ($10-$10 plus
ten options favoring, by varying degrees, the receiver and
ten favoring, by varying degrees, the allocator) having an
equal chance of being selected. Finally, the allocator could
decide to base the allocation on a form of merit. One of
the pretest questions was “how far did you travel to get to
the experimental site today?” In this last option, subjects
were told the computer would calculate the differential
in travel of the “two” subjects and prorate the payoff ac-
cordingly, with those traveling farther in relative terms
receiving the greater share.
Subjects were then told which allocation process the
allocator decided to employ. In actuality, subjects were
randomly assigned one of three cells (corresponding to
the three processes for arriving at an allocation proposal).
Subjects in the “allocator discretion” cell were asked to
wait while the allocator determined how much to pro-
pose to give and to keep; subjects in the “random” cell were
asked to wait while the computer used the random num-
ber generator program to select a proposal; and subjects
in the “desert” cell were asked to wait while the computer
calculated the distances each player traveled and produced
the corresponding allocation proposal. After a brief delay,
all subjects, regardless of their experimental cell, were then
informed that the proposed allocation was $18 for the al-
locator and $2 for the receiver. Same outcome, different
process.
Subjects were reminded that, as per the rules of the
game that had been described to all at the outset, they as
receivers now had the opportunity to decide whether or
not to accept the proposed allocation. If they accepted,
they would receive $2 from the pot, and the allocator
would receive the other $18. If they rejected the proposal,
it would be void and neither player would receive any
money. Subjects were then asked to make their decision,
after which they answered a few posttest items on their
views of the experiment and the allocator, were debriefed,
thanked, and excused.15
We have stated our general belief that variations in
the process will have an important impact on citizen ac-
ceptance of decisions but to this point have not identified
the specific procedures we expect to engender relatively
15At the end of the session, subjects were actually given a total of
$30 for their participation. This seemed only right since they did
not have a real chance of earning more than $2 (beyond the $10
they had been guaranteed).
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FIGURE 1 The Effects of Process on Decision Acceptance
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positive reactions. Consistent with the theory of wary co-
operation, our primary expectation is that receivers will
be the most put-off by allocators who intentionally used
their position to give themselves an untoward share of
the money. Those subjects placed in the cell where alloca-
tors had used their own discretion are most likely to feel
victimized since another human being made a conscious
decision to give only a little of the money to the receiver.
In the other two cells, however, the receiver believed the
unfavorable outcome was not due to a greedy allocator
but rather to bad luck or to the existence of an oppos-
ing player who was in some sense more deserving.16 On
their face, these last two processes introduce objectivity
in that the allocator has given the receiver a more or less
equal shot at a favorable allocation. For this reason, the
acceptance rate for the “allocator discretion” cell should
be much lower than that for either the “random” cell or
the “desert” cell.
According to Figure 1 this is precisely the case. Only
32% of those thinking they received $2 (of $20) due to
allocator discretion accepted the proposal, meaning that
better than two-out-of-three people were willing to forego
a positive offer. But this much is essentially a confirma-
tion of findings from the standard ultimatum scenario.
What makes our results unique is that they permit us to
compare this acceptance rate with that generated by al-
locations made via other processes. When the allocation
16For other findings that highlight the importance of decision mak-
ers’ self-interest, see Fehr and Rockenbach (2003).
was ostensibly determined by calculations of the respec-
tive distances traveled by the two players, the acceptance
rate of the same $2 (of $20) allocation jumped to 71%,
and when the allocation was determined by chance, the
acceptance rate of, again, a $2 (of $20) allocation was even
higher—80%. Even though the cell sizes are not large (40,
29, and 28, respectively), the differences between alloca-
tion by allocator discretion and the other two processes
easily meet traditional tests of significance (p < .01).17
The major point of this section is that process matters.
Just as previous research has established that behavior is
not driven solely by absolute outcome and that relative
outcome is a crucial predictor, our research shows that
behavior is not driven solely by the size of the outcome—
absolute or relative. When we control for outcome by
freezing in a payoff that is small both in absolute and
relative terms, substantial and significant variation is ap-
parent in acceptance of that payoff depending entirely on
the manner in which it was derived. Too often, analysts
assume people conflate a fair outcome with a fair process.
Our findings help to pull apart these two very different
concepts. Few could argue that an allocation of $18 for
17Given the clear direction embedded in the hypotheses, one-tailed
tests are used throughout. Though it is not a central concern of ours
and though the relationship does not approach statistical signifi-
cance (p = .24), the fact that a process relying on random allocation
engendered slightly more acceptance than one relying on desert is
a potentially interesting result. It is possible that people believe any
computation of merit or desert is susceptible to gamesmanship but
more research is needed before such statements can be made with
confidence.
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FIGURE 2 The Effects of Process on Receivers’ Perceptions
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one person and $2 for another is a fair outcome, but if that
outcome is believed to have resulted from a fair (random)
process four out of five people accept it.18
In addition to observing whether subjects accepted
or rejected the authoritative decision, we also adminis-
tered a short posttest questionnaire to the receivers. The
central item on this instrument asked whether subjects
thought “the divider was fair, unfair, or somewhere in be-
tween.” Responses could range from 1 (fair) to 7 (unfair).
Our expectation is that subjects who believe the allocator
decided to make the decision himself will perceive the de-
cision maker as much less fair than subjects who believe
the allocator left the decision up to chance or desert. As
can be seen in Figure 2, the results are perfectly support-
ive of this expectation. Receivers dealing with an allocator
who decided to retain authority to make the allocation
decision perceived the allocators to be quite unfair, an av-
erage placement of 6.6 on a scale running from 1 (fair)
to 7 (unfair). Allocators who agreed to tie the allocation
decision to a comparison of the relative distances traveled
by the allocator and receiver in coming to the experiment
were perceived as much less unfair (4.9 with 4.0 being the
18On the interaction of process and outcome, see Brockner and
Wiesenfeld (1996).
midpoint between fair and unfair). And allocators who
left the decision to random selection were perceived as
more fair than unfair (3.7). Once again, the actual out-
come was the same for all subjects (they received just $2
of the $20 pot) so these results show that perceptions of
fairness on the part of authoritative decision makers are
not entirely dictated by outcome.
In fact, even perceptions of the outcome are to a cer-
tain extent dictated by process. We also asked subjects
how satisfied they were with the money they received.
Even though all subjects received $2 and even though
the great majority were unsatisfied with this outcome,
there was still a statistically and substantively significant
difference in satisfaction with the outcome (money re-
ceived) traceable solely to the manner in which the dis-
tribution was determined (see Figure 2). When it was al-
locator discretion that led to the $2 outcome, receivers
were very unsatisfied (6.6 on a scale running from 1
[very satisfied] to 7 [very unsatisfied]); when it was a
comparison of travel distance, dissatisfaction dropped to
5.9, and when it was a random number generator, dis-
satisfaction dropped even further to 5.5 (both of the
latter two means are significantly different (p < .05)
from the mean for allocator discretion). While an appar-
ently fair process cannot make people happy with a lousy
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outcome, it clearly can make them less unhappy. More
specifically, the outcome resulting from a process in which
decision makers took direct steps to enrich themselves is
viewed as a less satisfying outcome than the same out-
come produced via more objective means. Two dollars is
not always $2.
Motivation, Not Only Process
If the theory of wary cooperation is correct about the im-
portance of traits attached to the decision maker, the same
basic decision process may produce quite different levels
of acceptance depending upon those perceived traits. The
trait we focus on here is the perceived motivation or ambi-
tion of the decision maker, a trait with obvious relevance
to the political world. Specifically, we analyze the effects
of variation in the decision maker’s desire to make the
decision. This is an area in which previous research has
produced useful if somewhat tangential empirical find-
ings. When the allocator is given that advantaged posi-
tion not because of random selection (as has been the
case in our experiments to this point) but because he in
some way earned the right to be the allocator (apparently
no matter how specious the “earning” process may have
been), allocators tend to be less generous to receivers and,
more relevant to our concerns, receivers tend to be more
accepting of unfair allocations (see Smith 2000; also see
Ridley 1996, 140).
But the extension of this finding to the political arena
may be problematic. Earning a position does not equal
coveting a position and previous experimental work has
never analyzed the difference. Why should it matter? Be-
cause earning does not reflect a person’s motivation. In
the earning experiments, an experimenter simply said,
“now we will have a contest.” In the motive experiments,
the participants were not given the chance to opt in or
out and therefore the wary cooperator’s perception of
their opposite number’s desire to be the decision maker
cannot be a factor. Why shouldn’t subjects be somewhat
more deferential to the “winner” of this contest, how-
ever trivial and irrelevant it may have been? But sup-
pose the decision maker is the decision maker because
he wanted to be in that position. The wary cooperator
immediately becomes suspect. Why would a person strive
to be in an authoritative position if not to take advantage
of it?
How does all this relate to politics? In the United
States at least, the campaign process is certainly viewed as
intense and demanding. The candidates who survive the
electoral gauntlet may well be thought to have “earned”
the right to be decision makers and therefore to have their
decisions accepted. On the other hand, from the citizens’
point of view, candidates’ willingness to put up with all the
hard work and negativity of the campaign may only con-
firm their suspicions about the sizable personal payoffs
available to those serving in office. By this logic, elected
officials are less likely to be viewed as those who have
earned their position than as those who are simply more
eager than ordinary people to be self-serving. If our read-
ing is correct, decisions will be less acceptable when they
are made by those who wanted to make them than when
they are made by those who may not have wanted to make
them.
To test this hypothesis, we introduced an additional
experimental intervention. Subjects randomly assigned to
a fourth experimental cell were put through procedures
similar to those described above except that in this case
subjects believed the allocator had no choice regarding
the allocation process. Recall that in the main experiment
above, Player 2 was told that Player 1 (the allocator) was
allowed to choose whether to rely on chance, merit, or per-
sonal discretion in dividing the money. Here, the choice of
how to make the allocation is forced on Player 1. Neither
random nor desert procedures were an option so the al-
locator (whom subjects believed was selected randomly)
was forced to use personal discretion. The acceptance rate
of receivers in this cell can usefully be compared with
the acceptance rate of receivers in the first column of
Figure 1; that is, with those receivers who reacted to allo-
cators they thought could have selected alternative proce-
dures (random or desert) but instead wanted to make the
decision themselves. We believe that receivers will be more
likely to accept a proposed allocation when the allocator
had discretion thrust upon him than when the allocator
overtly opted for discretion. Allocators in the first instance
may not have wanted to be given unfettered choice in how
to divide the money; allocators in the second instance did,
and we hypothesize this will make a difference to receivers
as they react to allocation proposals (still always $18–$2).
As expected, receivers were much more willing to
accept decisions made by decision makers who did not
overtly crave power. From Column 1 of Figure 1 we know
that just 32% of receivers accepted a $2 (out of $20) allo-
cation from an individual who could have opted against
making the allocation decision personally. But Figure 3
shows that when allocators had no option other than mak-
ing the allocation decision themselves, over 53% of re-
ceivers accepted an identical $2 allocation (p < .05). That
people react so differently to outcomes that are identical
in absolute and in relative terms, that have been rendered
by identical processes (that is, allocator discretion), and
that differ only in that one was made by a person who
seemed eager to maximize their own discretion and the
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FIGURE 3 The Effects of Decision-Maker Motive on Decision
Acceptance
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other by a person who was pushed into that position is a
remarkable statement on the importance to people of the
perceived characteristics of decision makers. People care
not just about who gets what and how they got it but also
about who gave it to them. To our knowledge, this is the
first empirical evidence that, controlling for perceptions
of greed, the belief that decision makers are ambitious
has an independent and relatively strong inverse effect on
decision acceptance. Apparently, being treated badly by
someone who did not necessarily want to be in a position
to treat us badly is much more tolerable than being treated
badly by someone who machinated to be in a position to
treat us badly.19
Different Circuitry, Not Only
a Different Response
We have seen in Figure 1 that subjects are much less ac-
cepting of decisions made by people who appear to be
taking advantage of them than they are of identical de-
cisions that did not entail decision makers intentionally
using their position to benefit themselves. But the theory
19People’s fondness for reluctant decision makers, from Cincinna-
tus to Colin Powell, is readily visible in these experimental results.
And it is quite likely that Figure 3 presents an understatement of the
consequences of ambition. The chances are good that if one cell of
subjects were reacting to decision makers who had visibly resisted
selection as the allocator and another cell to decision makers who
had openly courted the allocator role, the differential in acceptance
rates would be even greater than our more muted manipulation.
of wary cooperation holds that being played for a sucker
has the potential to create such serious problems that the
brain deals with it differently than other eventualities.
In addition to leading to a rejection of certain decisions,
aversion to being taken advantage of may also lead to a
different type of response in the brain. Social scientists are
increasingly using modern medical technology to observe
the human brain as decisions are being made. For exam-
ple, McCabe et al. (2001) used functional magnetic reso-
nance imaging (fMRI) to discover that the brain functions
completely differently when cooperation games are played
against a computer than when they are played against an-
other human being.20 Similarly, using electroencephalo-
grams (EEGs) instead of fMRIs, Wilson, Stevenson, and
Potts (2001) produced preliminary evidence that subjects
respond quite differently to simple games in which no as-
sessment of the other player is needed than they do when
playing more complicated games with mixed strategies
where the actions of the other player matter.
In light of these differences in activity, we thought it
possible that the brain circuitry involved in reacting to be-
ing played for a sucker is quite different from that involved
20Specifically, when playing against a computer only a small part of
the back of the brain (the part thought to be essential to calculation)
lights up, but when cooperative human beings are interacting with
other human beings, and not a computer, a large area of the pre-
frontal cortex (especially Brodmann areas 8 and 10) also light up.
These portions of the brain are typically referred to as convergence
areas since they allow the combination of raw calculation with more
socially oriented information about likely effects of decisions on the
other player and, presumably, subsequent reactions of that player
to the decisions (McCabe et al. 2001, 11834).
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FIGURE 4 The Effects of Process on Response Time for
“Unfairness” Item
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in decisions and outcomes that did not make subjects feel
that they had been intentionally victimized. We were not
in a position to attach our experimental subjects to medi-
cal devices, but we are able to provide suggestive evidence
because we made careful note of the amount of time it
took subjects to respond to the actions of the divider. Our
hypothesis is that when people believe they have been
played for a sucker, little time and thinking are needed in
formulating a response because the brain is hardwired to
react negatively to being played for a sucker but can af-
ford to react to other scenarios at a more measured pace.
In some respects, testing this hypothesis constitutes the
next stage in understanding differences in brain function
across varying situations. The research cited in the pre-
vious paragraph shows the differences that exist when
human agency is involved and when it is not. In our re-
search, another human is always relevant, but in one case
the decision maker has behaved in a self-serving fash-
ion and in the other case the decision maker has not. If
differences in response time are evident, more elaborate
tests, preferably with fMRIs would be valuable to learn
more about the peculiarities of brain reactions when it
is confronted with self-serving behavior on the part of
others.
Our operating hypothesis is that receivers respond-
ing to allocators who used their discretion to propose
a self-serving allocation will respond more quickly and
viscerally than subjects reacting to allocators who did
not use their own discretion (those in the “random” and
“desert” categories). We measured the length of time sub-
jects took to respond to the posttest item asking respon-
dents about the fairness/unfairness of the allocator and
compared the response time of those subjects victimized
by allocator discretion (here we combine allocators who
sought power and those who were given it) with those
subjects whose allocators left the decision up to chance or
desert.
As can be seen from Figure 4, results conform nicely
to expectations. Subjects who had been played for a sucker
by an allocator who used his/her own discretion to keep
$18 of the $20 responded to the fairness/unfairness item
relatively quickly, after just 6.6 seconds. But subjects who
were not the victims of a self-serving allocator (but were
simply unlucky or undeserving) took well over 10 seconds
to respond to the fairness/unfairness item, a difference
that is significant at the .01 level.
We want to be careful not to overinterpret these re-
sults. A difference in response time of three-and-one-half
seconds does not constitute conclusive evidence that a
new theory of human behavior is needed and available.
Nonetheless, the pattern in response time is perfectly con-
sistent with the belief that people are naturally frustrated
and even vindictive when they perceive others to have
been self-serving. This pattern, along with the findings
presented earlier showing people’s tendency to reject self-
serving decisions and to view with disfavor the makers
of those decisions, suggests that one of the pillars of our
social behavior is quite likely aversion to certain arrange-
ments. People often have a better sense of the procedures
they want to avoid than those they want to establish. This
is so not because people are unimaginative but because
they quite rightly divine the potential threat of an authori-
tative decision maker bent on furthering his own lot at the
people’s expense. It is not justice people crave so much as
injustice they abhor, and this preference ordering makes
perfect biosocial sense.
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Conclusion
Both the theory (the evolutionary advantages of certain
social behaviors) and the methodology (laboratory ex-
periments) employed in this article are nontraditional.
With regard to theoretical perspective, as mentioned pre-
viously, we readily concede that evolutionary psychology
is not the only theory that could account for the findings
we present. Human sensitivity to the social environment
could be learned or it could be the product of an urge to
be fair, but such assertions beg the question of why people
are socially sensitive or interested in fairness. The value of
the evolutionary perspective is that it offers an explana-
tion for these traits. Whether this perspective is right or
wrong, it is being hotly debated in the other social sciences.
Certainly some political scientists have used this theory
in their empirical research but they are few in number,21
and the discipline’s major journals have largely ignored
original investigations that employ the theory. Political
science should be more involved in the exchange over this
theory even if it is only to present evidence and arguments
countering it.
Turning to methodology, isolating the effects of pro-
cess as well as the traits of decision makers requires that the
decision itself (the outcome) be controlled. Locating two
situations in the real political world in which people view
the payoff to them as identical but the decision process as
different seems an impossible task. Indeed, simply mea-
suring the payoffs people receive (or think they receive)
from a given political decision is probably not feasible.
In light of these difficulties, we believe it is reasonable
to test the importance of process and traits by using ex-
periments. Still, perhaps the specific design decisions we
made prevent the experiments from being as relevant to
real decisions and to real politics as could have been the
case. We cannot defend our design against every charge
but we will address four likely complaints.
First, some psychologists worry that subjects may re-
act differently to monetary payoffs than to nonmonetary
payoffs. If true, our results would only apply to political
decisions that were thought to involve pocketbook mat-
ters and not issues of a more social nature. The consensus,
however, certainly among economists, is that the evidence
indicates a preference is a preference (whether it is mon-
etary or not) and that the more telling issue is the size of
the stakes (see Smith 2000, 16–17), which leads us to the
second complaint. Results generated when $20 is at play,
as was the case in our experiments, are not likely to be
21Names that come to mind are Robert Axelrod, Mark Lubell, Roger
Masters, Kristen Renwick Monroe, John Orbell, Elinor Ostrom,
Steven Peterson, John Scholz, Al Somit, and Rick Wilson.
similar to those obtained when $200 or $2,000 is at play.
We agree with this point completely, and it has been am-
ply demonstrated in previous research (see Brockner and
Weisenfeld 1996; Cameron 1999). Nonmaximizing con-
siderations take on decreasing importance as the stakes
are raised. But evidence suggests that for most ordinary
people typical political issues are low stakes games (see
Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002). Rank-and-file Amer-
icans simply do not believe they have much invested in
run-of-the-mill political outcomes. As such, outside of
being prohibitively expensive,22 using high-stakes labo-
ratory experiments to draw conclusions about people’s
acceptance of typical political decisions would be grossly
misleading.
Third, not only did our experiments involve fairly
small-stakes monetary payoffs, they involved a situation
in which subjects received an inappropriately small pay-
off. The mean allocation in a $20 ultimatum game is be-
tween $7 and $8. The allocation in our experiment was
just $2. Again, we do not deny (and previous research has
demonstrated) that other payoffs would lead to different
behaviors on the part of the receiving subject. Our reason
for incorporating a relatively unsatisfying allocation into
the experiment is the fact that public opinion research has
indicated that most Americans feel they do not receive
their fair share of resources from the government. We
wanted to replicate this environment by making subjects
feel they had not received a fair share from the allocator.
Finally, our experiment was single-shot (not multiple-
play), meaning subjects were told that, subsequent to the
one game, they would not be interacting any more with
the other player. Why? Of course, cooperative behavior
goes up in typical multiple-play laboratory games because
players believe (rightly) that their actions in Round 1 will
affect the decisions of their compatriot in Round 2 and
beyond. This is unlikely to be the case in repeat interac-
tions with the government, however. Roles in the game are
never reversed since the government is always the alloca-
tor; moreover, the government is rarely influenced by an
individual receiver’s acceptance/rejection of an earlier de-
cision. So a multiple-play laboratory experiment seemed
unnecessary and perhaps even ill-designed to capture the
realities of citizen reactions to governmental allocation
decisions.
Even as we believe our decisions are defensible, we
see great value in subsequent research manipulating our
design so that the consequences of these changes can be
observed. In fact, this approach is the only way we will
22High-stakes experiments are usually conducted in developing
countries where income differentials allow Western researchers to
observe behavior when the equivalent of several months salary is at
issue for the subjects (see Cameron 1999).
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obtain a more complete view of the conditions under
which people tend to accept or reject authoritative de-
cisions. Absent this empirical research, all that is possible
is idle speculation about what a reader thinks might have
happened if this feature or that had been altered. If our
research does nothing more than stimulate further em-
pirical research on the effects of political decision-making
processes, we will have accomplished something.
And just what do our findings have to say about these
effects? That if people are convinced the political pro-
cess makes it impossible for decision makers to benefit
themselves at the expense of non-decision makers, they
will be surprisingly accepting of governmental decisions,
even those that are unfavorable to them from a substantive
point of view.23 This is especially true if the people believe
that decision makers did not want to be decision makers
in the first place. With apologies to Groucho Marx, people
do not want an individual to be a member of the decision-
making group if the individual wants to be a member of
that group.
The key question people ask in determining how they
will react to a governmental decision is not, “what did I
get?” It is, “have I been screwed?” Far from being a quirk,
an anomaly, an oddity, or a learned reaction, people’s in-
tense desires to contribute but to avoid being taken ad-
vantage of, even if acting on these desires means getting
less of a payoff than they otherwise would, are core com-
positional features of humans. And these features would
appear to have important implications for politics gen-
erally and specifically for the kind of authoritative de-
cisions people are likely to accept and to reject. People
will accept decisions that ask them to sacrifice if they be-
lieve others (especially decision makers) are behaving ap-
propriately, but if they believe others are behaving in a
self-serving fashion, they will not only cease cooperat-
ing, they will spend their own resources to punish the
malefactor.
The essence of the human condition may not be
pretty but it is sensible from the point of view of a
species reliant upon viable group environments. In strug-
gling to understand political and other behavior, we must
recognize that this essence is embodied in neither the
peaceful, unambitious, totally altruistic, noble savage of
Rousseau nor the self-obsessed, uncaring, materialistic
demander of immediate tangible gratification described
by Hobbes. Altruists and egoists walk among us but
they are overwhelmed everywhere and always by wary
cooperators.
23Witness people’s strong support for (reward neutral) Supreme
Court justices even in the face of extremely unpopular decisions,
such as in the flag burning and Nazi march cases.
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